At the phenomenal level, consciousness can be described as a singular, unified field of recursive self-awareness, consistently coherent in a particular way; that of a subject located both spatially and temporally in an egocentrically-extended domain, such that conscious self-awareness is explicitly characterized by I-ness, now-ness and here-ness. The psychological mechanism underwriting this spatiotemporal self-locatedness and its recursive processing style involves an evolutionary elaboration of the basic orientative reference frame which consistently structures ongoing spatiotemporal self-location computations as i-here-now. Cognition computes action-output in the midst of ongoing movement, and consequently requires a constant self-locating spatiotemporal reference frame as basis for these computations. Over time, constant evolutionary pressures for energy efficiency have encouraged both the proliferation of anticipative feedforward processing mechansims, and the elaboration, at the apex of the sensorimotor processing hierarchy, of self-activating, highly attenuated recursively-feedforward circuitry processing the basic orientational schema independent of external action output. As the primary reference frame of active waking cognition, this recursive i-here-now processing generates a zone of subjective self-awareness in terms of which it feels like something to be oneself here and now. This is consciousness.
Introduction: The Mystery of Consciousness
Isaac Newton spoke for many if not most involved in scientific research regarding the nature of consciousness when he lamented to a fellow scientist that "to determine by what modes or actions light produceth in our minds the phantasm of colour is not so easie" (circa 1710). Three centuries of further research finds the situation essentially unchanged (Fodor 1992:5; c.f. Leibniz 1714; du Bois-Reymond 1874; Mercier 1888; Carpenter 1896; Freud 1940; Magoun 1952; Sutherland 1989; Humphrey 2006) . 1 Consciousness has proved exquisitely elusive in the face of concerted empirical research over centuries, to the extent that many today either question its reality (Huxley 1893; Ryle 1949; Wilkes 1995; Dennett 1991 2 ), or insist that while real, it was never meant to be understood by a human mind shaped by evolution for other tasks (McGinn 1989; Humphrey 2006; Pinker 2007) ; or again, that it simply cannot be understood because of the irreducible and unbridgeable divide between subjective and objective domains of knowledge (Nagel 1974; Creutzfelt 1978; Levine 1983; Jackson 1982 Jackson , 1986 Searle 1985 Searle , 1992 Bisiach 1992; Chalmers 1996; Dietrich & Hardcastle 2004) . But, in fact, cognition has available to it a highly developed general problem solving capacity-the semantic memory 3 system-which already successfully applies 1 The history of postbehaviorist reengage m e nt with the question of consciousness is traced in Shallice (1991) .
2 Are analysts correct in accounting De nnett an eliminativist regarding consciousness (Shallice 1992 ; Van G ulick 1992; Block 1992; Aronson et al 1992; Anthony 1992 ; Gly m o ur et al 1992; M a n g a n 1993; Revonsuo 1993; Seager 1999) ? Den nett e m p h atically denies he is a behaviorist for who m ' e v erything except hu m a n behavior is a fiction '(1991 Appendix A) . Indeed the book's 511 pages are devoted to a serious consideration of cognitive processes in general and consciousness in particular. Ter minology like ' o ur conscious states', ' s elfconscious thinking', ' strea m of consciousness' and ' c o n scious in the fullest sense' recurs continuously (17, 21, 29, 124, 132, 136, 180, 212, 225, 259, 264, 275, 281, 445) . But this is m erely philosophical sleight of hand, for in fact, Den nett never ceases his insistance that ' there is no reality of conscious experience' (132), only a seeming to be selfaware that is just a ' m a g nificent fiction ' (366, 429) , an intellectual error involving the misidentification of w hat has actually taken place cognitively (134), which is in reality a series of unconscious perceptual ' c o ntentfixations' (113) dubbed ' m ultiple drafts ' (111ff, 431) , acco m p a nied by a s m orgasbord of additional cognitive operations (attentional probing 1356); propositional attitudes about the content fixations (128, 132, 317, 364) ; the running of m e m e s on (210) or m etacognitive self m o nitoring (311) on a Von N eu m a n n e sq ue simulation m a c hine-there is no attempt w hatsoever to synthesize a single coherent recipe of consciousness in the book). This co m bination of successive drafts along with a second operation of one kind or another can generate the false sense, claims D enn ett, that one see m s to be subjectively self aw are, w here in fact one is not (134), it is all an illusion (311). For De nnett, as for his 1950's behaviorist m e ntors Q uine and Ryle, there is no subjective pheno m e n ology (365): no qualia, no self and no consciousness as actual direct subjective self a wareness. Co nsciousness has indeed been explained away. 3 Experiments conducted in the 1970s by the Ca nadian psychologist Endel Tulving and his associate Daniel Schacter proved that "intension" (such as concepts) and "extension" (such as episodes) are dealt with by two different types of m e m ory: episodic m e m ory contains specific episodes of the history of the individual, while se m a ntic m e m ory contains general kno wledge (both concepts and facts) applicable to different situations. Episodic m e m ory, which receives and stores information objective anaytical methods to 'subjective' phenomena as the study of physical self-sustaining dissipative systems (Prigogine 1955; Bickhard 2004 Bickhard , 2008 , and as the study of biological organisms which are homeostatically self-regulating (Bernard 1859; Cannon 1932) , somatically self-maintaining (Maturana & Varela 1973) , self-representing (Churchland 2002ab) , and in the case of the immune system self-recognizing (Tsutsui 2004) . Manifestly, there is no a priori basis for the assertion that cognitive subjectivity is in principle intellectually impregnable, particularly in regard to empirical analysis and description.
The seemingly intractable mystery of consciousness has a simpler, more immediate explanation, rooted in the incompleteness of current neuropsychological theory. The problem of explaining the properties of phenomenal experience in psychological (and ultimately biophysical) terms finds a parallel, as Antii Revonsuo suggests (2005:287-291) , in the conundrum encountered by science a century ago, when attempting to explain the relation of chemistry to physics and biology to chemistry. In both instances, the discontinuity between properties dissolved as scientists understood each level of organization with more precision -the role of electrons in atomic physics sufficient to explain chemical binding, and the role of macromolecules and complex biochemical feedback pathways sufficient to explain biological activity.
Similarly, the apparent discontinuity between the phenomenal properties of consciousness and empirically-demonstrated psychoneurological processes is most likely to derive from an incomplete understanding of cognitive processing mechanisms on the one hand (Medwar 1967; Horgan 1999; Churchland 2002a:157, 170) , alongside an insufficiently-precise analysis of the phenomenal properties of consciousness on the other. Accordingly, the explication of consciousness as recursive self-location will align the core phenomenal characteristics of consciousness (consistent self-awareness as subject located here and now) with a specific cognitive construct (self-locational schema) processed in a particular recursively feedforward manner.
Phenomenal Properties of Consciousness
Conscious cognitive processing is consistently coherent in certain distinctive ways. Significant psychological features include its cyclical activation over the sleep/wake cycle, distal representational format, limited processing capacity, seriality and close association with short term memory, attention, and the detection of novelty. However, vociferous debate as to the critical qualities of consciousness has established a consensual recognition that no explanation of consciousness can be considered complete without addressing a specific set of core phenomenal properties (Chalmers 1995 (Chalmers , 1996 Levine 1983; Nagel 1974; Block 1995) . 4 Unity, recursive processing style and egocentric perspective are among the features most frequently cited as basic phenomenal characteristics of consciousness (for summaries of phenomenal properties see Searle 1992; Metzinger 1995; de Sousa 2002; Revonsuo 2005; Delacour 1995 Delacour , 1997 Weisberg 2005) . A fourth essential phenomenal ingredient of conscious self-awareness, the self, calls attention to the fact that the (egocentric) first-person perspective is not expressed in the abstract-as merely an egocentric point of view-but is represented in concrete spatiotemporal terms as a distinctlyperceived self, which is not merely oriented spatially and temporally from the first-person perspective, but orientationaly situated -as an "I" situated "here" and "now" (de Sousa 2002:150; Nagel 1986:61; Metzinger 1995:16; Revonsuo 2005:133) . At the level of phenomenal experience, this spatiotemporally situated i-here-now flows continuously forward through successive events as a singular, ongoing event-moment, a unified "stream of consciousness" (James 1890) characterised primarily by its indivisableness (Descartes 1641; Kant 1781/7; Bretano 1874) and its explicitly autoreferential, recursive or subjective style of cognitive processing (Searle 1992) . Subjectivity, the distinctly recursive, referring-back-upon-itself processing regime which manifests phenomenaly as subjective self-awareness, constitutes the central defining characteristic of consciousness for an ever-increasing quorum of analysts (Wundt, 1896; Pieron, 1951; Nagel 1974; Weimer, 1976; Ey, 1978; Searle 1980 Searle , 1992 McGinn, 1983; Lycan 1987;  about temporally dated episodes and spatiotemporal relations a m o n g the m, is a faithful record of a person's experience. Se m a ntic m e m ory, instead, is organized kno wledge about the world (Schacter & Tulving 1994) . Jackendoff, 1987; Kunzendorf, 1988; Schacter 1989; Strehler; , Gallup, 1991 Edelman, 1992; Damasio, 1992; McLaughlin, 1992; Sommerhoff & MacDorman, 1994; Picton & Stuss, 1994; Harth 1995; Levine 1995 Levine , 2001 Bogen, 1995; Flohr 1995; Metzinger 1995; Chalmers 1995; Deikman, 1996; Carruthers 2000 , Greenfield 2000 Mandik, 2001; Rosenthal 2002; Koch 2004; Sieb 2004; Dietrich & Hardcastle 2004; Legrand 2007) . Accounting for this recursive, autonoetic capacity in terms of a credible cognitive mechanism constitutes, arguably, the major challenge for any theory of consciousness. Subjectivity, in its turn, underwrites "raw feels" or qualia, the capacity to experience inner feelings (love, hope, fear), thoughts (plans, opinions) and unadorned sensory feels like the redness of a ripe tomato, the smell of gasoline or the discomfort of a pebble in the shoe (Block 2007:22) .
In the following proposal, this complex of phenomenal properties will be accounted for in terms of a tonically-activated spatiotemporal event schema configuring the continuous self-to-environment interaction as a single ongoing event, the structural parameters of which are causal, spatial and temporal. Expressed in the egocentric terms of a first-person perspective necessary for action control, these structural parameters consist of a tonic I-ness, here-ness and now-ness. The architecture within which this egocentric event schema is continuously processed, involves feedback processing necessary to relate action output to homeostatic needs. This processing mechanism will be seen to have developed into a highly-attenuated recursive feedforward circuit as a result of evolutionary pressures for energy-saving forms of processing (Diagram 3 items 'b' and 'c'). The tonic recursive processing of the i-here-now interactive event schema underwrites subjective self-awareness such that it feels like something to be oneself here and now.
Cognitive Elements Comprising the Content of Consciousness
Cognition represents With or without nervous systems, almost all living organisms have found a way of responding adaptively to environmental changes through movement. Photosynthetic organisms such as plants maximize their ability to harvest light by actively orienting stem and leaves toward the sun. Subcellular microtubules, as a consequence of changes in electric polarization which induces movement, are able to position themselves and shift positions so as to move about within the cell. Single-celled eukaryotes such as amoeba and paramecium achieve motility using hairlike flagella activated by a chain of molecular sensors.
Electrotonically-based nervous systems, on the other hand, provide several advantages over molecular chains: (1), a capacity for spontaneous endogenous activation (Passano 1963) ; (2), faster signal propagation (Pumphrey & Young 1938; Mackie 1970) ; (3), signal amplification through spike propagation (Mackie 1990:911) ; (4), more selective activation based on sensory pattern recognition (Mackie 1990:908) , and (5), a capacity to coordinate the action of multiple effectors, underwriting a capacity for more complex movements through multiple dendrites and axon corollaries (Parker 1946; Passano 1963; Pantin 1965; Horridge 1968; Mackie 1970) . But arguably the biggest advantage is that nervous systems can represent, they can generate mediating informational states (Markman & Dietrich 1998 ) that carry & display information about something other than itself -information about the external environment and internal bodily homeostasis. 5 Representation remains a somewhat controversial issue (reviews include Gallistel 2006; Markman & Dietrich 2000; Haselager & de Groot 2003) . However, it is difficult if not impossible to adequately account for a host of cognitive functions without some notion of representation, particularly in the case of hallucination, and dreaming where there is no external input at all (Revonsuo 2001; Ullman 1980) . If cognition operates in terms of representations, what, precisely, do representations represent? Is the representational system a kind of Triesman Machine, involved primarily in the manipulation of cobbled-together surface features of objects (Triesman 1996 (Triesman , 1998 ; or by contrast, is it designed to operate in terms of a portrayal of dynamic action events (Neisser 1975; Zacks & Tversky 2001) . If the latter, is representation configured at base in terms of the singular ongoing dynamic self-movement event involving the organism as it interacts continuously with its environment? The evidence indicates that cognition is designed first and foremost to manage the ongoing dynamic agent-to-environment interactional event. Moreover, it is designed to manage self-movement in relation to the environment as an actively self-moving platform. This fact is critical, because it determines the format in which interaction is represented and managed, and the structural parameters of that format will constitute the essential content of consciousness.
Cognition represents ongoing mobile interaction of the self-moving agent with the environment Evidence suggests that cognition provides biological organisms with the means to extend homeostatic self-regulation through the provision of a selfmovement capacity (see 4. The Architecture of Consciousness below). This means that cognitive systems are self-movement systems, designed to operate while moving, to represent in terms of interaction while on the hoof as it were (Clark 1997) , as a moving platform (Merker 2005) . Within the embodied cognition and dynamical systems literature, the understanding that cognition manages interaction and does so while mobile is referred to as situated activity (Wilson 2002:626) . This designedfor-motility or situated character of cognition underwrites the design of cognitive processing in several critical dimensions. From the perspective of Evolutionary Psychology, perceptual systems first emerge to detect the self-movement of the agent through the environment (Milner & Goodale 1998) , and virtually all perceptual channels anticipatively adjust their output for this ongoing self-movement through the environment in order to maintain the stability of the egocentric perceptual display 6 (Held 1965; Merker 2005:90; Bell 1989; Towel & Hartmann 2006; Blazquez, Hirata & Highstein 2004; Bridgeman, van der Heijdan & Velichkovsky 1994; VanDoorn et al 2005) . Moreover, object recognition requires interactive self-movement both to develop properly (Held & Hein 1963) , and to function optimally when developed (Schrater, Knill & Simoncelli 2001; Gibson 1947 Gibson , 1950 Gibson , 1957 Gibson, Gibson, Smith & Flock 1959; Horridge 1987; Collett 2002; Jokisch & Troje 2003) .
Indeed the entire perceptual process is configured in terms of motile agent-to-environment interaction. Studies show that entities are first perceptually "individuated" as locus-of-movement (Raftopoulos 2004; Carey & Xu 2001; Spelke 1990) , and then initially identified through categorization in terms of kinds of movement (Heider & Simmel 1944; Csibra et al 1999) . Ensuing interpretation, in turn, focuses significantly on action potential-how the subject can/should interact with the object, what the object offers or affords in terms of the potential-for-action (Gibson 1979; Newton 1996; Cohen 2000:11; Graesser 1997; Solomon & Barsalou 1997) . As a result, the knowledge base drawn upon in this affordance-identification process is configured in terms of a privledged interactive "basic level" of categorization (Rosch 1973 (Rosch , 1975 (Rosch , 1999 reflecting the distinctive actions we perform on particular classes of objects. Indeed, the entire spatiotemporal manifold in which behavioral output is represented as taking place (0000, 0000) is inherently meaningful to the cognitive system only by virtue of bodily interaction, the history of self-motion in term of these spatiotemporal parameters. Primitive meaning schemas relating to space (up/down, in/out, front/back, left/right, near/far), motility (momentum, source-path-goal, towards/away from), force (compulsion, blockage, counterforce, resistance, enablement, attraction), and particularly temporal (then/now) and spatiotemporal schemas (fast/slow, change) are all action-oriented and derived from self-movement through the environment (Poincaré 1902; Grush 2000; Mandik 2005 ).
Most significantly, the distal "out there" representational format itself serves the agent-to-environment interactional purpose. Perceptual representations reflect neither sensory stimulation nor the excitation patterns in the brain. Rather, events as a whole (including objects and agent) are represented as positioned beyond the sense organs (Prinz 1992:6) , in a way that satisfies the needs of action control (Millikan 1984 (Millikan , 1995 Brunswick 1956; Mandik 2005; Rosenberg & Anderson 2008) . And this distal format is itself further configured in terms of an interaction-oriented first-person perspective that involves the perspective of an agent in relation to the environment in which he is situated. In this sense, cognitive structures configured to facilitate and manage agent-to-environment interaction can be said to be "embodied". They arise from bodily interactions with the world (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Harnad, 1990) and act as "controller of embodied action" (Clark 1997) or agent-to-environment interaction.
The fact that sensory individuation, perceptual identification, the memory knowledge base and representational format are all configured in interactional terms, indicates not simply that cognition is designed to guide action (Glenberg 1997; Barsalou 2002; Borghi, Glenberg & Kaschak 2004; Borghi 2005) , but that the cognitive system is designed to operate under actionoriented circumstances (ongoing agent-to-environment interaction). The organization of motor output is similarly structured to operate in the midst of ongoing mobility. Action output is more or less continuous, commencing immediately upon perceptual input, and continuing in successive waves of adjustment and realignment as action proceeds (Coles et al., 1985; Eriksen, Coles, Morris, & O'Hara, 1985; Eriksen & Schultz, 1979; Smid et al., 1990; Neumann, 1990) . Consequent upon this commitment to ongoing motility, interactional cognition bears the marks of being time-pressured, of having to function under the pressures of real-time interaction ("runtime") with the environment (Wilson 2002:627; cf., Brooks, 1991; Pfeifer & Scheier, 1999; van Gelder & Port, 1995) .
Ongoing mobile interaction is represented cognitively as one ongoing interaction managed as self-location The fact that cognition is designed to operate as a moving platform, in terms of ongoing interaction, suggests that this process is configured cognitively as one singular temporally extended action event. That is to say, ongoing interaction is represented not simply as an event, but as the same event with the same representational structure at every successive moment. For purposes of management, that structure is configured in terms of the moment-to-moment spatiotemporal location of the agent in relation to the environment. Interaction is managed by the interactor in terms of moment-to-moment self-location. Gallistel points out (2006) that direct electrophysiological observation of neural activity has shown that the nervous system represents where the animal is and has been within the environment, how it is oriented in terms of both its spatial and temporal relationship to the environment. That is to say, the cognitive system manages the ongoing interactional event in terms of a continuously updated computation of spatiotemporal self-location. In order to represent self-to-environment interaction, cognition constructs an egocentric reference frame (Franklin & Tversky, 1990; Sholl, 1999; Carlson, 1999) which is continuously and automatically updated (Farrell 1998; Wang & Brockmole 2003; van Oostendorp 1994; Blanc & Tapiero, 2001; Riecke & von der Heyde, 2002; Bjork, 1978) in relation to ongoing self-movement through the landscape. The reference frame is selflocating because it is constituted by continuous updating through a combination of external sensory, as well as internal proprioceptive and vestibular feedback from self-movement to yield an ongoing sense where and when the organism is in relation to the environment (Ventre-Dominey & Vallee 2007; Riecke, Beykirch & Bülthoff 2003 , Wirth et al 2007 Wang & Brockmole 2003) . 7 The spatial aspect of self-locational functionality, which is computed on the basis of self-motion cues rather than with reference to external visual or acoustic landmarks is referred to as path integration (Bloomberg et al. 1991; Glasauer et al. 1994; Israël and Berthoz 1989; Klatzky et al. 1990; Thomson 1983; Gallistel, 1990; Etienne & Jeffery 2004) . 8 The temporal aspect of self-location is referred to as scalar timing (or interval timing), which involves the computing of rate of motion and time spent travelling in a certain direction (Eagleman 2005; Alexander, Cowey & Walsh 2005; Berthoz et al 1995; Capelli et al 2007; Glausner 2006 ). Phylogenetically, this spatiotemporal self-locating navigational functionality has been identified in crustaceans (Hoffman 1984; Zeil 1998; Layne et al., 2003ab) , fish (Moller 2008) , insects (Müller & Wehner 1988; Etienne et al 1998; Collett & Collett 2000) , arachnids (Moller and Görner, 1994; Ortega-Escobar, 2002) , reptiles, 9 birds (Saint process w as originally referred to as "dead reckoning", by analogy with the deduced ("ded") reckoning historically used by sailors to navigate across featureless open sea. First postulated by and described by M urphy (1873), in reply to Dar win, as the integration of inertial signals, it has m ore recently co m e to be called "path integration" Mittelstaedt, 1980, 1982) to reflect the assu m ption that the process takes place by the addition of successive s m all increments of m o v e m e nt onto a continually updated representation of direction and distance from the starting point. Ethologists in particular have studied "Path Integration" m ainly through ho ming behavior in the context of foraging. This calculation is here denoted "Self Location" to reflect the fact that it also, and m o st importantly, co m p utes current location in the environ m ent (Gallistel 1990 ). et al. 1995) , and mammals (Mittelstaedt & Mittelstaedt 1980; Etienne et al. 1996; Seguinot, Cattet & Benhamou 1998; Redish 1999) , including humans (Glasauer et al. 1994; Mittelstaedt and Mittelstaedt, 2001 ).
1982; Regolin
Because the cognitive system is designed for constant interactivity, it is designed, ipso facto, to constantly track this ongoing interaction. Consequently, egocentric self-locational updating can be considered as constituting the primary ongoing reference frame (Hartley & Burgess 2002; Vogeley & Fink 2003; Avraamides & Sofroniou 2006; Briscoe 2008; Kelly, Avraamides & Loomis 2007; Wirth et al 2007) , and can be accounted, in some sense, the functional heart of the cognitive system. Intelligent, cognitively-managed self-movement in relation to the environment is in large measure navigation through the environment based on a constant calculation of where and when one is at any given moment (Maguire 1998; Wallentin 2008) . And this sense is a functional necessity -agents lacking representational knowledge of the where and when of themselves in relation to the environment are functionally disabled (Miall & Wolpert 1996 : 1267 .
The ongoing self-locational event is represented in terms of a single set of egocentric orientational parameters -i-here-now Tonic spatiotemporal updating maintains an egocentric action-event representation in the form of spatiotemporal self-location of the causal agent, the self-mover in relation to the environment. These three primary parameters of event representation, spatial, temporal and causal are configured in agent-centric terms, because computations designed to generate and control selfmovement in relation to the environment must necessarily be framed in terms of the perspective of said self-movement-the first-person or egocentric perspective of the agent. The structural parameters of the interactive event are, then, causal, spatial and temporal. Casting these in the perspective of the self-moving agent: the egocentric depiction of the self-moving causal agent (the self-mover) at every moment is "I" (or perhaps, more primitively, "this"); the egocentric representation of real space, actual spatial location of the agent-in-relation-to-the-environment is always "here"; and the egocentric representation of real time, the actual temporal location of the agent-in-relation-to-the-environment at every interactional moment is "now". Collectively, these three egocentric parameters structure the self-locational reference frame, the fundamental self-locating interactional event schema of the cognitive system as i-here-now. The extraction of the three critical parameters from the continuous processing of the ongoing interactional event to form a single, self-locational schema involves a process of schema-abstraction operated by the cognitive system as part of the normal process of memory consolidation, whereby the structure of interactive events is abstracted and retained as a skeletal event-schema. (Bartlett 1932; DiSibio 1982; Alba & Hasher 1983; Ost & Costall 2002) . Ongoing experience is subsequently assimilated and configured in terms of these abstracted event schemas (Minsky 1975; Neisser 1976; Mandler 1988 Mandler , 1992 Rumelhart 1980; Schank & Abelson 1977; Nelson & Gruendel 1981 Hudson 1986 Hudson , 1997 . Experienced events are constantly configured (and consistently coherent) in terms of the egocentric self-location of the agent (Wallentin 2008) within a spatiotemporal manifold (Grush 2000 (Grush , 2005 Dainton 2000) of subjective presence (Metzinger 1995 (Metzinger , 1998 Revonsuo 2006) because the configuration of events is consistently engineered (and constantly updated) in terms of this basic schematic spatiotemporal reference frame. Moreover, I shall argue that when this schematic reference frame is activated within a recursive processing architecture (see section 4 below), the selflocational update will manifest phenomenally as the ongoing sense of consciously being-in-the-world here and now.
Because the three structural parameters of the self-locational schema constitute the basic content of consciousness, it is important to clarify precisely what they represent. As the i-here-now reference frame models an ongoing dynamic relational process between agent and environment, a relationship rather than things or objects themselves, it cannot properly be considered a model of the self and the environment (Edelman 1987 (Edelman , 1989 (Edelman , 1992 (Edelman , 1999 (Edelman , 2003 Damasio 1994 Damasio , 1999 Damasio , 2000 Gibson 1987 & Neisser 1988 , Churchland & Churchland 2002 ) or a respresentation of the self model nested in a map of the environment, as has also been proposed (Mountcastle 1978; Johnson-Laird 1983 James, 1890; Newton, 1991; Somerhoff & Macdorman, 1994:159; Delacour 1995; Metzinger 2000 Metzinger , 2003 Metzinger , 2005 . Nor, certainly, does the i-here-now reference frame derive from a model of the world where the self is an optional ingredient (Revonsuo 2005) or utterly irrelevant (Yates 1975; Lehar 2003) . There must needs be a source for the "I" reference, given that the cognitive representational system is a distal or intentional representation system which provides no intrinsic self-reference whatsoever. 10 Representations, as Kant noted over 3 centuries ago, are always about something other than themselves (Kant 1781-1787; Bretano 1874; Husserl 1900), and do not refer to the cognitive machinery that immediately underwrites them. But if cognition is not referring to itself as "I", then whence this persistent, ubiquitous self-reference? Several lines of evidence converge to suggest that core or minimal self is grounded in the capacity for self-movement or "agency", designating the self-mover as causal parameter of a singular but more complex representation, that of the interactional event. Firstly, as reviewed above, the basic operational principles of cognition reflect a system dedicated to the representation of dynamic events, not things, Objects are most primitively individualized and identified as motion events (Raftopoulos 2004; Carey & Xu 2001; Spelke 1990) , and the self, consequently, should be expected to follow suit as the representation of self-motion. Specifically, the cognitive system constructs its representational panorama in terms of the ongoing self-movement-to-environment interactional event. The operational management of this interaction is made possible by its representation in terms of the spatiotemporal location of the self-movement in relation to the environment. This, in turn suggest that the subject of cognition-that which is located spatially and temporally-can be nothing other that this self-mover.
The structure of cognition reflects a configuration based on the representation of the self as causal parameter of a selfmovement event in several ways. Firstly, "I" constitutes the central viewpoint of a spatiotemporal manifold configured in terms of a first-person perspective, rather than a non-centered object-oriented panorama. This egocentric configuration, as argued by Grush and others, is based on the capacity for and skills involved in self-movement (Grush 2000; Brewer 1992; Evans 1982) . The basic constituents of the perceived panorama (up, down, in, out, foreground, background) have an orientational structure reflecting how I act (Taylor 1978-9) , which implicitly defines the "I" as just this self-moving actor. Secondly, the self-model is necessarily related to agency because self-reference functions within a predictive forward-modelbased processing structure (see "Architecture of Consciousness" below) dedicated specifically to the predictive management of self-movement (Hohwy 2007) . And finally, the temporal structuring of cognitive experience in terms of before, after and duration, along with the constant conscious tabulation of a psychological now moment ("the 'specious present') both reflect the dedication of the cognitive system to the perception of dynamic events (not static things) and management of selfmovement in particular (Gregory 1997; Dennet & Kinsbourne 1992; Georgopoulos 2002; Nobre & O'Reilley 2004; Brown & Rosenbaum 2002) , with attendant implication that subjective center of that autoactivity will be a self construed as actor/agent.
Psychological tests confirm the agental core of the self. In an experiment designed to ascertain the degree of accuracy of subjective reports about one's own movements, and to determine the type of signals used for monitoring self-generated actions, Georgieff & Jeannerod (1998) found that self-specification is action-related, not body related. That is, visual signals of a moving hand interpreted as self-movement override internal body sensations (proprioceptive/kinesthetic signals) of the subject's actual stationary hand. Self-recognition is based on perceived action of hand, not mere somatic presence; subjects essentially 'privilege movement-related visual information over kinesthetic information ' (J & G 1998:7) when determining what forms part of the self ('mineness' or ownership). Remembering that within the anticipative forward model processing 10 By contrast, there is the notion that all internal representational states are inherently self aware (Neisser 1976; Searle 1979 Searle , 1992 Lycan 1996:11 ; Da m a sio 1999 ). In addition to brain/mind dualism, Descartes promoted the equally unhelpful idea that ' n othing m ediates between a m e ntal state and our being conscious of it (Rosenthal 1992) . Nineteenth century pheno m e nology refined this position by coopting the 'intentional' or distal referencing property of m e ntal representations, to insist that ' a m e ntal state is conscious by virtue of being intentionaly directed at itself' (Kreigel 2003) . The view persists. With little in the way of hard answers to the hard question, there is the temptation, Keith Sutherland notes (2000) , for scholars to simply posit consciousness as intrinsic to all internal representational states, with the result that Panpsychism currently enjoys a revival (Clark 2004; Rangarajand 2008) . Ho w ever, the evidence appears clearcut that m e ntal states are not intrinsically self referring either in the sense of (1) refering to themselves as m e ntal/physiological states, (2) of understanding themselves or (3) of automatically m o nitoring themselves. W e experience the colors of a tree as of the external tree out there, not as m ental paint (Harman 1997 ) by virtue of whch we experience the tree. M oreover, we experience the visual depiction of a tree, not the optic array on the eyeball. Self experience can be deceptive (experienced pain in the leg m ay in fact result from a slipped disc impinging upon the sciatic nerve in the back), and self understanding faulty (Nisbett & Wilson 1977) because m e ntal states have no direct introspective access to the workings of their own cognitive or neural m achinery. Cognition conveys information about distant causal antecedents without also carrying information about the proximal cognitive operators or operations carrying the information (Dretske 1981:158; cf Miller 1962; Prinz 1992; Velmans 2000; M arcel 2003) . Finally, as to the intrinsic capacity for cognitive m e ntation to m o nitor itself, we have only to note that the greater part of cogntive m e ntation is unconscious -i.e e m phatically not m o nitoring itself. Conscious m e ntation therefore, requires an additional cognitive operation of so m e kind, which this article identifies as recursive processing (see section 4).
system (see section 4 for details), perception is an integral part of the self-movement production system, this is not merely movement-related information, but information generated by the self-movement-production system. The self, by extension, must be a construct representing the self-mover.
This reliance on information generated within the action-production system for distinguishing self from nonself is dramatically expressed in alien hand syndrome where a functional dissociation between higher intentional (agental) and lower movementexecution levels of the motor-control hierarchy produces an internal sense that a particular limb does not belong to the subject (Assal, Schwartz & Vuilleumier 2007) . Schizophrenic dissociation based on lack of feedback from self-produced action result in the conviction that certain acts do not belong to the subject (Frith 1992) . In both cases, the sense of what constitutes "me" is determined within the machinery of self-movement. Indeed, as Meijsing points out (2000), the ongoing sense of self in proprioceptively deafferented subjects lacking somatic registration of bodily presence, is maintained by self-movement. This dissociation of bodily sense from self sense reflects the separation, at the neurological level of the body map of the somatosensory cortex (located along the postcentral gyrus of the parietal lobe-Brodmann areas 3a, 3b, 1 and 2), from the medial fronto-posterior axis of self-referential cognitive processing (Northoff 2004 (Northoff , 2006 Kjaer, Nowak & Lou 2002; Seger, Stone & Keenan 2004) .
While self-construct is connected most closely with agency, the converse also holds: the absence of a sense of self is also tightly correlated with the diminution in the capacity for self-movement. Prominent among the features of Depersonalization Disorder is the diminution of a sense of self underwritten by a lack of a sense of agency, of control of one's actions, resulting in a common complaint that the subject feels like an automaton or robot (Sierra & Berrios 2001; Metzinger 2003:326) . Diminution of the self-sense is accompanied by various kinds of sensory anesthesia. The loss of self forms part of a diminished capacity for action, self-movement. 'It's as if you have no self, no ego, no remnant of that inner strength which quietly and automatically enabled you to deal with the world around you (will, agency), and the world inside you. It may settle over time, into a feeling of "nothingness", as if you were without emotions, dead' (Steinberg & Schall 2000) . In the extreme form of Cotard's syndrome (the 'Delierium of Negation'), subjects deny that they are alive, claiming their bodies are now dead (present but not functioning) and parts are often missing (Berrios & Luque 1995) . Depersonalization then, points to a non somatic, agency-related basis for the minimal sense of self.
In sum, psychological and neurological studies indicate that the self or "I" is a cognitive construct representing most essentially the self-mover, the agent. This self-movement capacity constitutes the third causal parameter of a singular, selflocating representation of the ongoing interactional event, which serves to simultaneously form ongoing cognitive experience as a self-to-environment interactional event, and in so doing, to differentiate the self-mover from the environment, selfmovement from other-movement (Hohwy 2007; Boyer et al 2005; Legrand 2006:20) .
The ongoing enaction of every interactive moment then, takes place in terms of a common structural framework, the spatiotemporal self-location of the agent from a first-person perspective. The self-locational i-here-now schema is the BASIC recursive processing architecture (see below), this self-locational schema has the potential to manifest cognitively as a form of subjective self-awareness.
Evolution of the Architecture of Consciousness
While the self-locational i-here-now schema underwrites the distinctive self-orientating content of consciousness, it is the autoreferential or recursive quality (or processing style) of conscious self-awareness which constitutes what most analysts consider its defining characteristic. Self-referencing is not an intrinsic characteristic of mental representation (see note 10 above), and will be explained here as the consequence of a predicitve processing architecture which developes, as a consequence of evolutionary pressure for greater energy efficiency, a recursively-predictive circuit for processing the selflocational i-here-now schema. The recursive processing architecture underwriting conscious subjectivity, then, does not appear like a miracle de novo. It evolves from existing feedforward, and prior to that, feedback processing architectures.
Whence a cognitive processing architecture based initially on feedback? This question relates directly to what cognitive systems essentially do. The preceding section provided an extensive review of evidence indicating that cognition is designed to guide action (Glenberg 1997; Barsalou 2002; Borghi, Glenberg & Kaschak 2004; Borghi 2005) . But the complete explanation is that cognition is essentailly designed to guide action in relation to homeostatic/emotional needs (Churchland 2002a:105; Basso & Olivetti Belardinelli 2006:75) . Cognitive systems are to be found not in physical stuff (air, water, rocks, gas), but within biological organisms. This is crucial for understanding what cognition actually does, why it exists at all. The fundamental challenge for all biological organisms is to maintain survival by sustaining homeostasis-the internal conditions supporting life-in the midst of ongoing interaction with an ever-changing, often-threatening environment (Cannon 1932; McMillan 2005) . Cognition provides a means of extending the biological capacity to maintain homeostasis through interaction by extending the capacity to control the organism-to-environment interaction. This is accomplished by self-movement (Richter 1937 (Richter , 1942 Ashby 1960:58; Young 1964:000; Panksepp 1982:415; Cisek 1999; Damasio 1999; Bickhard 2004 Bickhard , 2008 ). As noted above, almost all living organisms have found some way of responding adaptively to environmental changes through movement. Cognition is one movement-facilitating solution, but one that has distinct advantages, most notably the capacity to represent.
Cognition then, is essentially an adaptive extension of the organism's homeostatic control system to aid ongoing survival and reproductive success (Anderson 2007) , and self-movement serving homeostasis forms the heart of that extended selfregulative functionality (Damasio 1999; Parvizi & Damasio 2001; Young 1964) . Primitive cognitive systems then, essentially provide a capacity for self-movement to biological organisms that welcome any means of extending their capacity to maintain homeostasis. But, self-movement unconnected to ongoing metabolic needs will not suffice. A cognitive organism unable to relate what it is doing to what it needs for ongoing homeostatic balance will not survive -cannot survive (Rosenbleuth et al 1943; Ashby 1960; Young 1964; Churchland 2002:76) . Thus, cognition is of necessity configured most basically as a control system that relates ongoing action outcomes to current homeostatic needs, thereby self-regulating its homeostatic condition by self-movement or self-to-environment interaction.
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The funda m e ntal idea behind self regulative cognitive processing has been kno w n since at least the time of Aristotle, and w as well expounded by Herbart (1825) and William Ja m es (1890). It is that organisms act so as to bring about the conditions they desire, or, m ore primitively, the conditions they ho m e o statically require. They shape their interaction with the world in a self beneficial direction by constraining their behavior toward agree m e nt with internal perceptually represented goals (desired states) rather than m ere reactivity to m o m e ntary external pressures (Ja m es 1890; Miller, G alanter; Pribram 1967) . Ideo m otor control of m otor output then is achieved through the controlled approximation of perceptual input resulting from m otor action with perceptually represented goals (Marken 1986; Bourbon 1995) . S R P m e a ns perceptually represented goal acting to initiate and control behavior.
But survival and reproductive success depend not only on a self-regulatory operating regime, but on the regime's ability to operate in an energy efficient manner, because motor output is energy expensive. And biological organisms can be viewed most basically as energy regimes (over half the body's weight is devoted to cellular elements that manufacture energy), so that 'any organism that can capture prey, escape predators and achieve goals with a minimum demand on metabolic energy, has an evolutionary advantage' (Neilson & Neilson 2005:283) . Thus, whatever the somatic and neurological changes engineered by the need to meet specific environmental challenges, the challenge is always to operate with maximum energy efficiency. In the evolutionary kingdom, energy is the coin of the realm, as it were, and several theorists cast the critical agent-to-environment interaction specifically in these terms, such that phylogeneticly-emergent energy-transformation regimes interact with an environment-as-energy-gradient in order to sustain themselves (Jarvilehto 1998; Lotka 1945; Odum 1983; Vandervert 1995; Kauffman 1995) . In terms of the critical relation between action and homeostasis, cognitive systems can thus be viewed as managers, not simply of ongoing homeostatic balance, but of the energy budget available to maintain that balance through action. Consequently the brain is in large measure devoted to reducing the risk of energy expenditure through action, and recursive orientational processing that requires virtally no physical action-output will become one of its most significant evolutionary achievements (see below).
The evolutionary pressure for ever-greater energy-efficiency has driven elaboration at several functional levels of the neurocognitive system. At the molecular level, the energy cost of information transfer has been found to constitute a significant constraint on the number of signaling molecules and synapses used by neurons (Schreiber 2002) . In terms of neuronal interconnectivity, it has been suggested that energetic costs could limit absolute numbers of neurons and synaptic connections (information channels) in the brain (Laughlin 1998; Laughlin et al. 2000) . At the systemic level, it has been suggested, in consonance with the notion of a perceptuo-motor hierarchy first outlined by Hughlings-Jackson and his contemporaries (Magoun 1958; Berntson, Boysen and Cacioppo 1993; Prescott, Redgrave & Gurney 1998; Deacon 1989) , that the evolution of the forebrain's self-regulative management system is reflected in a hierarchy of control systems, from the purely homeostatic concerns of the hypothalamic diencephalon through emotional limbic and finally cognitive cortical level of control (Watt & Pincus 1994; Panksepp 1998:35, 70ff; LeDoux 1996; Edelman 1992:118; Damasio 1999) . Within the context of this general notion of an evolutionary perceptuo-motor hierarchy in the forebrain, the management of self-to-environment interaction in terms of spatiotemporal self-location can be understood (as outlined above) as a core function and the primary reference frame for the ongoing cognitive level control of perceptuo-motor processing. Most significant in this regard is the fact that evolutionary pressures for increased energy efficiencies have encouraged not only the emergence of successive levels (or tiers) of control, but also the elaborative changes in the control mechanism itself, which, studies indicate, has evolved from feedback (Diagram 1), to feedforward (Diagram 2), and finally, within the spatiotemporal self-location (path integration) module, to a simplified, recursively-feedforward circuitry (Diagram 3 items 'b' and 'c'). In so doing, the hierarchical perceptuo-motor control system is provided with an energy-saving default state of cognitive activation in its top tier which does not require physical motor-output for its completion. As discussed below (Self-regulative processing evolves from feedforward to recursively feedforward), it is this recursive processing circuit in the top tier that underwrites the state of consciousness.
Feedback provides the link between homeostasis and self-movement In the 19 th century, French physiologist Claude
Bernard highlighted the necessity of biological organisms to maintain a consistent internal physico-chemical environment (the milieu intérieur), which permits internal vital processes to continue functioning, independent of physicochemical perturbations in the external environment (Bernard 1859; Cannon 1932) . Self-movement is one means to that end-adopted in some form by most biological organisms (Richter 1937 (Richter , 1942 . The earliest self-regulatory processing (S-R-P) mechanism that serves to maintain a tight relationship between behavioral motor output and internal homeostatic needs, comprises a simple negative feedback control mechanism (Diagram 1). Within such a system, behavior is no longer simply a kneejerk reaction to external stimuli, but a reaction geared to the maintenance of critical internal conditions. The fundamental S-R-P operating principle linking motor output to homeostatic needs is initially embodied within cognitive functionality in the form of feedback control, which acts to restore deviations from regulated internal set points through corrective external actions. In this way, the brain exercises control over homeostasis by using motor output to produce desired homeostasis-regulating inputs (Cisek 1999) .
In Diagram 1, this feedback control processing architecture is illustrated in terms of a representation of current state, which is compared to that of desired homeostaticallybased goal state (DS) in a comparator w, with the disparity driving continued motor output until CS more closely approximates DS. Simpler versions of this architecture (Toates 1986:37; Wagner 1999:55; Schulze & Mariano 2003:11-4; Manning & Dawkins 1996:31) often omit a principled representation of the current state, which must be coherently represented in order to be compared to desired state (DS), particularly when the CS of this particularprocessing module is not a simple biological marker such as glucose level, but the current spatiotemporal selflocation of the agent in relation to the environment. The ongoing coherence of this Current-State-of-SpatiotemporalOrientation representation is maintained by the continuous structuring input from a memory buffer (Merfeld 2001; Bridgeman et al 1994; Neilson & Neilson 2005) containing the BASIC INTERACTIONAL EVENT SCHEMA. As explained in section 3, the selflocational i-here-now schema, is an abstracted generalization over ongoing interactive experience which serves to organize ongoing phenomenal experience (Current State) in terms of an extended spatiotemporal manifold, or more fully, in terms of a self-moving causal agent continuously located spatially and temporally within such a manifold. The continuous activation of this schema configures experience as spatiotemporally-calibrated interaction betweeen agent and environment such that selfmovement can be calculated. But over time, evolutionary pressure has encouraged the exploitation of the potental discontinuity between orientational schema activation and the actual output of action, and consciousness is the result. Due to time and energy-efficiency pressures, self-regulative processing architecture evolves from feedback to feedforward Cognitively endowed self-regulating biological organisms are particularly exposed to evolutionary pressures for energy efficiency because of the dedication of cognition to regulating homeostatic levels via energy-expensive motor output. As outlined above, cognition essenttially regulates homeostasis via action output. But the fact that the cognitive system has been constituted to function as a continuously moving platform presents two significant problems for the maintenance of homeostasis via selfmovement: feedback processing is too slow for accurate control of a constantly-mobile cognitive organism (Churchland 2002a:82) , and in addition, too costly in terms of the energy-expensive of corrective actions. To overcome multiple delays in sensorimotor feedback loops (Miall & Wolpert 1996 :1269 Miall et al 1993: 205; Grush 1997:14; Jordan 2004:408) , and eliminate the need for further corrective movements as far as possible (Basso & Olivetti Belardinelli 2006) , fast motor control must necessarily be anticipative as far as possible, involving a combination of predictive (anticipative) feedforward models of both muscle kinematics and the perceptual outcome of movement (Desmurget & Grafton 2000) . On the energy-expense front, physical activity of any kind risks depletion of scarce energy reserves with no guarantee of replenishment. As a means of minimizing this risk, the central selfregulatory-processing (S-R-P) mechanism has evolved from a feedback mechanism that corrects for homeostatic deviations, to feedforward processing that operates proactively through anticipatory actions to defend internal homeostatic conditions from becoming deviated.
Feedforward processing provides increased energy efficiency in several significant ways: most basically, predictive adjustment to ongoing motor output saves energy through improved accuracy and minimization of the motor trajectory (Morasso 1981; Wolpert & Flanagan 2001) . Anticipation of (rather than feedback from) environmental change reduces the ultimate effect and thereby, the amount of compensatory adjustment required (Brosilow & Joseph 2002) . In the case of anticipated danger for example, predictive feedforward circuitry underwrites the capacity for complete avoidance (Prescott, Redgrave & Gurney 1998:18) . The capacity, in feedforward architecture, to represent the expected results of upcoming actions provides the basis for replacing aimless wandering with proactive, goal-focused foraging (Droulez and Darlot 1989; Glasauer 1992; Lewald and Ehrenstein 1998; Rao and Ballard 1997) , as well as the anticipatory orientation of attention toward stimuli which are relevant for action in general (Mehta and Schaal, 2002) . In addition, feedforward representation provides the capacity to completely replace energy-expensive external trial-and-error activity with internal mental planning (Tolman 1932; Craik 1943:61; Mandler 2002:107) . Finally, feedforward goal representation supports not just trajectory minimization, but action minimization, the replacement of attack with threat (of attack), of extended bodily movement with gesture as the initial basis of communication.
The net result of these avenues to improved energy efficiency is a cognitive system capable of anticipatively self-regulating for homeostasis by means of feedforward processing mechanisms. The universality of this anticipatory feedforward architecture is reflected at several levels, including sensory processing (Bruner & Postman 1949; Droulez & Darlot 1989; Glasauer 1992; Lewald and Ehrenstein 1998; Rao and Ballard 1997; Neisser 1976; Gregory 1980; Cotterill 2001) , attention (Lavigne & Denis 2001; Mehta and Schaal, 2002) , motor control (Bhushan and Shadmehr 1999; Darlot et al. 1996; Mussa-Ivaldi 1999; Yasui & Young 1975; Wolpert et al., 1995; Davidson & Wolpert 2005; Nair et al. 2003; Decety & Jeannerod 1995; Bickhard 2005) , including anticipatory postural adjustment for upcoming self-movement, and mental imagery (Jeannerod, 1994 (Jeannerod, , 2001 Kosslyn and Sussman, 1994) . Consequently, several theories of cognition have been proposed (Craik 1943; Cotterill, 1998; Hesslow, 2002; Barsalou 1999; Grush 2004) , based on the notion that cognitive representation is essentially engaging in simulated interaction with the environment by means of internal predictive internal models (Pezzulo 2006) Most significantly, as regards the central claim of the theory outlined here, the dedication of cognitive architecture to an anticipative feedforward processing format (for speed and energy efficiency) implies that the recursive circuitry required to underwrite conscious subjectivity is most likely to have evolved out of such predictive cognitive architecture. Specifically, this theory proposes that evolutionary pressures for ever more energy-efficient sensory-motor processing has encouraged the progressive attenuation of feedforward processing circuitry into a simplified recursive feedforward circuit capable of underwriting autoreferential conscious self-awareness. The architecture customarily used to model predictive feedforward processing casts the perceptuo-motor control system as a Markov processor whereby the current states of a process lead to its own future states when current motor commands exert their effect. These future states, in turn, update the current state (Grush 2004:2.1) . Markov process models explain the mechanical operations involved in guiding the transition of present state into the next present state. These anticipatory processing mechanisms use predictive or "forward" perceptual models of what the future state will be (if we go ahead and execute this action) as a way of guiding the transition from present moment to next present moment. Specifically, anticipatory S-R-P architecture (as illustrated in Diagram 2) utilizes four internal models to represent the various elements of the predictive Markhov control system: models for the desired state (DS), the actual current state (CS), the predicted future state (forward model FM) and a structuring schema to form both CS and FM into a consistent event representation-the BASIC INTERACTIONAL EVENT SCHEMA (Event Schema) abstracted from the ongoing agent-to-environment interaction (as explained in section 3).
Within the feedforward control circuit (as with negative feedback loop), the desired homeostatic state (DS) is constantly compared (w) with the actual current state (CS), and actions are generated on the basis of the difference between the two. But action generation necessary to close the gap between DS and CS is not random trial and error. The system makes use of an Inverse Controller (or inverse model) to provide motor commands specifically tailored to achieve a desired sensory outcome state. The capacity to match motor command with sensory representations has been confirmed by the recent discovery of "mirror neurons" (Rizzolatti et al 1996; Gallese et al 1996) in the prefrontal cortex which enable the subject to mimic actions performed by another, indicates that neural systems have the capacity to translate sensory input (viewed behavior) into specific kinds of motor output (a copy of the action viewed). When connected to a memory system that stores sensory-input to motor-output conjunctions, the brain is capable of retrieving motor output likely to produce required sensory inputs (Held 1968; Gyr 1972) . This kind of sensory-motor memory module-an Inverse Controller-is capable of taking as input a perceptual representation of the required adjustment and producing as output the motor movement that will result in perceptual feedback incorporating that adjustment so that Current State (CS) becomes more closely aligned with Desired State (DS). The Inverse Controller, in other words, translates the desired perceptually-represented goal of a movement into the set of actions (a motor command) needed to achieve that movement (Atkeson 1989; Ghahramani & Wolpert 1997; Wolpert & Kawato1998; Neilson & Neilson 2005 ).
The Inverse Controller also produces a copy of its motor command (corollary discharge, efference copy) which underwrites a predictive or "forward" model (FM) of the expected perceptual result of that action. The forward model, in other words, uses efference copy of the motor command to predict the sensory consequences of those commands whenever movements are made (Wolpert et al. 1995; Miall & Wolpert 1996; Wolpert 1997; Wolpert & Ghahramani 2000; Wolpert et al. 2001; Blakemore, Wolpert & Frith 2002 ). The forward model is able to feed into a DS comparator (w) and anticipatively adjust ongoing action; at the same time, the forward model predictivly updates CS in advance of feedback from actual motor output. There are thus three processing loops in this system: two fast internal feedforward loops from Inverse Controller to Forward Model which then (1) updates Current State as well as (2) feeding forward into a DS comparator to effect correction to motor output on the run. A third time-delayed loop (3) proceeds from the Inverse Comparator to motor output and feeds back to CS via the sensory systems.
The CURRENT STATE ESTIMATE (CS) is the central representation in this control system because it is the end result that is being controlled for (or more correctly, its proximity to DS is being controlled for). CURRENT STATE is constituted by three inputs: (1) continuous feedforward updating from the Forward Model; (2) periodic feedback from the sensory systems (as gated by expected feedback represented by the FM); and finally (3), CS is consistently structured as the representation of an interaction event by the structuring input from a memory buffer (Merfeld 2001; Bridgeman et al 1994; Neilson & Neilson 2005) consisting of the BASIC INTERACTIONAL SCHEMA (Event Schema [ES] ). Based on brain imaging studies consistently identifying the posteromedial cortex as the neural source for conscious cognition (Fiset et al 1999 , Laureys 2004 Cavanna 2007) , and the direct innervation of this area by the wake/sleep arousal system sourced from the postero-lateral hypothalamus via the basal forebrain (Saper, Scammell & Lu 2005; Jones 1998; McGinty & Szymusiak 2003) , it is postulated that this structure-providing EVENT SCHEMA memory buffer is independently activated by the sleep/wake innervation system, thus providing a self-activating base to the interactional configuration of waking experience. The ES-CS feed can be envisioned as a kind of self-activated working memory circuit.
The functional independence, as it were, of the EVENT SCHEMA feed is of particular importance, given that CS is a computation of spatiotemporal self-location updated moment to moment from self-movement feedback (as well as anticipatory FM of expected feedback). Without the initial structural input from the EVENT SCHEMA feed, CS would be utterly dependent on continuous movement for its activation. As the primary reference frame of the cognitive system, this would, in effect, hold the entire cognitive economy hostage to ongoing movement, both large limb ambulatory movement and tonic postural adjustment. The EVENT SCHEMA memory buffer is relatively independent of sensory feedback for its activation, and as a result of continuous evolutionary pressure to reduce energy-expensive physical activity to a minimum, it is encouraged to become more so, to sustain its activity through self cueing. Self-activation of ES accounts for the twin facts that (a) orientative self-locating spatial updating is automatic & continuous (Farrell 1998; Wang 2003; Rieke 2007) , and (b) that self-location is still operative in deafferented individuals where there is no active sensory feedback from self movement (Meijsing 2000) . Additional evidence for the independent self-activation of ES can be gleaned from phenomena such as change blindness (Grimes 1996) , which indicates that the cognitive system does not depend on external feedback to maintain a consistently activated, self-located perceptual state. The driver for this continuity must be top-down, originating in its self-activated structural matrix, the BASIC INTERACTIONAL EVENT SCHEMA.
In sum, evolutionary energy-efficiency pressures on a cognitive system built initially for the generation of self-movement for active regulation of homeostasis, have encouraged the development of feedforward (top-down) processing architecture that can maintain orientative cognition even when the organism is more or less stationary (such as during periods of rest, vigilance as well as immobile ambush hunting or predator avoidance immobility) such as to constitute a base state of alert action readiness for the timely resumption of appropriate action (predation, avoidance of predation etc). The significance of the connectivity involved in this feedforward processing architecture is that under evolutionary pressure to achieve further energy efficiencies, the processing circuit can be minimized and the connectivity simplified to the point that feedforward processing functions as a single recursively feedforward circuit capable of underwriting subjectivity.
Self-regulative processing evolves from feedforward to recursively feedforward As noted in our initial treatment of the explanadum, it is the phenomenal properties of conscious self-awareness that need to be explained, and primary amongst these, the self-referring or recursive quality of subjective self-awareness, which underwrites the feelings and sensations of qualia. Several existing explanations of phenomenal subjectivity refer to psychological processing mechanisms which are not, in themselves, recursive in nature, such as Daniel Dennett's multiple drafts (a series of static updates), or secondary processing theories such as higher-order thought (Rosenthal 1997; Dretske 1993 ) and higher-order perception (Armstrong 1981; Lycan 1990) , attentional highlighting of representational content (Crick 1984 , Damasio 1989 Harth 1993; Hobson 1994; Mandler 1975; Näätänen 1992; Neiser 1976; Velmans 1991) , synesthetic multimodal representation (John 1976; Geschwind 1970; Hunt 1995; Jerison 1973) , linguistic coding (Edelman 1989 , Creutzfeldt 1979 Luria 1978; Olds 1992; Skinner 1974) or global accessibility (Dennett 1978 (Dennett , 2001 Baars 1988) , where additional processing of a perceptual representation somehow confers qualia-like status upon it. But in each case, the process doing the consciousness-conferring does not employ autoreferential processing circuitry and is not itself self-consciously aware. A more credible candidate for the generation of autoreferential self-awareness (consciousness) would be a self-referring cognitive mechanism, a processing circuit which is itself recursive, continuously feeding back upon or 'referring to' or 'recognizing' itself. This is the solution proposed here. In a nutshell, everything currently known about he evolution of cognition points to a consistent increase in attenuated processing of existing circuitry as a more energy-efficient way of maintaining homeostatic self-regulation through self-movement. Attenuation of feedforward circuitry (Diagram 2) leads to fully recursive feedforward circuitry (Diagram 3).
Attentuation plays a major role in the metamorphosis of the self-locational updating module from a merely anticipatory feedforward mechanism to a recursively-feedforward processor. For cognitive organisms, where cognition is essentially designed to maintain homeostasis through self-movement, the drive toward improved energy efficiency necessarily involves both brain and body operating efficiencies. In both instances, attenuation constitutes a common theme. When somatically active, all movements are constructed on a minimum-trajectory basis which is managed by last-minute, only-as-much-as needed adjustments (Todorov & Jordan 2002; Todorov 2004) . Periods of behavioral torpor (sleep, hibernation) can be seen as a way of limiting active self-to-environment interaction to only the most energy-rewarding periods. Proactive foraging that deploys top-down feedforward circuitry to focus activity on specific targets is, again, a form of attenuated activity . And the development of communication from bodily gesture can also be seen as embodying this tendency toward attenuated somatic activation. Undoubtedly, the most extreme form of behavioral attenuation is exibited in surviving species of primitive tunicates which abandon both somatic (tail, tail musculature) and cognitive (brain, nervous system) capacity for motility altogether. Surviving forms develop a gut, gills and brachial structures which are present but no longer operative (Llinas 2001:17) , indicating that these creatures have regressed from what was once a more actively-motile life, to a highly-attenuated 1-day excursion to find a suitable substrate to attach itself before resuming a permanently sessile existence.
Attenuation is particularly critical for cognitive processing, because the brain, unlike the body, expends most of its energy on active informationm processing, not metabolism. Where the soma devotes 70% of its energy budget to ongoing metabolism and the balance to behavioral activity (posture, locomotion, mating), cognitive costs are the reverse. The brain expends 80% of its energy on information processing as opposed to purely metabolic activity (Raichle & Gusnard 2002; Attwell & Laughlin 2001) . Thus, the achievement of energy economies in the way information is processed have a significant impact on the overall energy expenditure (Attwell & Laughlin 2001 ) and the cognitive economy, as a result, is replete with cost effective information-processing mechanisms such as sparse coding (Churchland, Ramachandran & Sejnowski 1994; Irwin & Andrews 1996) and minimal updating of scene (Rensink, 2000; Noë, Pessoa & Thompson 2000) , schema abstraction for memory storage (Hess & Flannagan 1992; Taylor & Crocker 1981) , and attentional limitation (Mack & Rock 1998) . Attenuation of the feedforward processing architecture leeds to the development of recursive processing circuitry.
Understood in terms of the ongoing interactive event, which consists of an initial self-locational calibration (i-here-now) followed by action output, attenuation proceeds on two fronts: (a) an extension of the initial orientative phase of interactional processing while minimizing the subsequent physical action component; and (b) the development an extremely truncated feedforward processing circuit within the orientational phase itself, facilitated by decreasing dependence on feedback from self-movement as major driver of the circuitry, and an increased capacity to complete its feedforward processing loop internally. This attenuated circuitry consists eventually, of the orientational schema feeding forward immediately into itself, independent of additional representational feedback from self-movement. This recursive self-conversation, as it were, constitutes the rudiments of subjectivity, so that the recursive processing underwriting conscious subjectivity emerges, in effect, from the increased evolutionary fitness derived from exchanging energy expensive physical activity for low-cost prephysical orientative processing. Thus, the primary (but certainly not the sole) adaptive value of recursive conscious processing is energy efficiency.
Diagram 3 illustrates the specifics of this evolutionary development from feedforward to recursively feeedforward processing circuitry. Here, SL CURRENT STATE constitutes the final representative product of the self-locational feedforward processing architecture. It is normally understood that continuous spatiotemporal updating involved in this process is driven largely by external sensory and internal proprioceptive feedback from self-movement. But while spatiotemporal self-location constitutes the primary orientational reference frame on the basis of which motor output can be calculated (distance from "here" to there), it is also the case that the perceptuomotor-control system consists of a hierarchy of these kinds of feedforward calculations (Brooks 1986; Prescott, Redgrave & Gurney 1998) . Thus it is possible for the top tier of the processing circuitry to evolve away from absolute dependence on feedback from physical self-movement without the entire motor control hierarchy grinding to a halt. Evolution encourages development in this direction because it produces cognitive circuitry that can remain activated without reliance on actual energy-expensive physical movement. Organisms than can remain cognitively alert while minimally active at the physical level have increased fitness.
Increased reliance of the self-locational processor on internal drivers for continuous activation begins, as we have noted above, with the self-cueing EVENT SCHEMA that provides the basic structure of first the CS and eventually both CS and FM representations. Continued evolutionary pressure for increased energy efficiency then, encourages further development in the familiar form of attennuated processing. In the particular case of self-locational updating, this consists of decreased reliance on feedback from external physical self-movement (shown in Diagram 3 as a change from heavy to light connectivity in the external loop) along with increased emphasis on the internal processing circuit comprised of the reciprocal CS-FM circuit. Decreased external feedback means that both CS and FM can be envisaged as consisting to an ever-greater extent of the structural input from the EVENT SCHEMA memory buffer. As it does so, the CS-FM circuit is able to become ever more tightly interlocked because more completely based on its own arousal feed for self-activation, and less dependent upon the DS comparators as drivers. Essentially, this enables the self-locational calculation to complete its cycle within the CS-FM circuit alone. CS drives FM, and FM drives CS where each, eventually consists solely of the 3-parameter EVENT SCHEMA. This highly attenuated positive feedback loop is now completely recursive, and driven by a self-activating memory buffer which is directly linked to the wake-sleep cycle of its principal arousal feed sourced in the lateral hypothalamus. The recursively-processed content consists essentially of the same EVENT SCHEMA represented as current i-here-now state (CS) and the expected next current i-here-now state (FM). 13 The CS-FM circuit has emerged as a stand-alone recursive working memory loop or reverberatory circuit consisting of the i-here-now Event Schema referrring continuously back upon itself. Because it is self-activating and thus tonically sustainable as well as supremely energy efficient, 14 this new form of self-locational alertness 13 The idea that consciousness consists of the m erger of the im m ediate present with the im m ediate future can also be found in the explanation of the pheno m e n al present m o m e nt as a blend of past, present and future. Natika Ne wton and Ralph Ellis contend that the 'te m p oral thickness' of conscious awareness derives from a weaving together of new sensory input with the m e m ory of im m ediate past input, along with anticipations (expectations) of im m ediate future input. (Newton 2001; cf. Ellis & Ne wton 1998:425) . 14 Consciousness provides an exte mely energyefficient form of cognitive activation by (1) restricting activation to the orientative phase and eliminating the energyexpensive physical output phase of interaction; (2) minimizing cognitive orientative activation to a single sche m a, which (3) underwrites sparse coding of self inenviron m e nt representation. H aving e m erged under the aegis of evolution's de m a n d for energy efficientcy, consciousness solidifies its postion by underwriting two further benefits of critical importance: (4) the self sustaining recursive circuitry underwrites an additional forward m o d el loop for offline future planning of ways to achieve goals; and (5) the circuitry also underwrites the capacity to imaginatively determine the desired goal state (DS) itself independent of shortterm ho m e ostatic needs. This independence provides for a fully proactive approach to life and the energy savings which accrue to m a xi m al use of longterm goal decisions and forward planning. Incorporating these energysaving benefits, consciousness beco m e s entrenched within the cogntive system, underwriting as it does a significant portion of cognition's ticket to ride -it's evolutionary fitness. With so m a ny advantages, and with cognitionasm otor output m a n a g e m e nt under such pressure to econo mize, the rudimentary beginnings of recursive orientational sche m a processing undoubtedly begin sooner in the evolutionary timescale than currently assu m e d. becomes the default processing state of active cognition; a default state of recursive i-here-now schema processing which manifests at the phenomenal level as subjectivity, conscious self-awareness.
Consciousness, therefore, can be considered the by-product of incessant evolutionary pressure on cognitive organisms for greater energy efficiency, pressure that has driven the existing self-regulatory FC architecture toward greater attenuation via a more tightly recursive format involving the CS-FM-CS working memory loop such that the orientational schema phasing between an immediate present (CS) and immediate future (FM) as itself, is simultaneously anticipating and recognizing itself, or tonically monitoring itself in the form of i-here-now.
In terms of Nagel's sense of subjectivity wherein there is always "something it is like to be that organism, something for that organism (Nagel 1974:436) ; that "something it is like to be" is everywhere and always primarily what it is like for that organism to be an i-here-now. The recursive i-here-now is always what subjectivity is like. As outlined in the first section of this proposal, subjectivity consists in experiencing oneself as here and now at every moment in every circumstance. This being oneself here and now has an immediacy which encompasses both agency (I am performing this act) and ownership (this object is part of me) such that before initiating any intellectual operations or discursive thought, and independent of them, I am already "directly" acquainted with the contents of my self-consciousness. Self recognition entails self-discernment: I always know which one is me, which one I am. I am never unfamiliar with myself, never surprised by my presence. I experience myself as being identical through time; I experience my leg subjectively as always having belonged to me; I always experience my thoughts, my focal attention, and my emotions as part of my own consciousness; voluntary acts are initiated by myself.
At the phenomenal level, conscious self-awareness arises as a singular unified field of self-awareness because underwritten by a single schema, processed continuously in an autoreferential or recursive style where "self" is always experienced, subjectively, as an "I" explicitly located "here" and "now". This recursive i-here-now processing provides the basis of subjective self-awareness, of what it feels like to be oneself here and now. This is consciousness.
Conclusion
Consciousness bears the self-locational content that it does because orientation grounds the behavioral output of any selfmoving cognitive platform. Framed in the egocentric perspective of that self-moving platform, the structural parameters (spatial, temporal and causal) of the ongoing, constantly-updated orientational event are abstracted and fused into a single schema, the activation of which provides the basic reference frame for ongoing cognitive experience. Consciousness manifests as a unified singularity because it is the recursive processing of this single self-same schema (Mandler 2002:45) . Consciousness is thus a process not a substance (contra Descartes 1644). The autoreferential character of conscious cognition derives from the recursive style in which the self-locating orientational schema is processed, tightly self-referring circuitry which derives from attenuative evolution of feedforward architecture into recursively feedforward processing regime.
How does this explanation relate to the question of consciousness as generally posed in terms of the core phenomena of subjectivity and qualia in relation to the electromagnetic activity of the brain's neurological processing -How does matter become imagination (Edelman & Tononi 2000; cf., Anderson 2007; Koch 2004 :1-2).
There would appear to be two distinct questions here: (1) How does the physics of electromagnetic activity generated in the brain come to comprise cognitive representation as such? And (2), how does a particular stream of cognitive representation become conscious self-referring (and thus subjective, qualia-like) representation (cf., Damasio 1999: 9, 170) ? In the foregoing, we have attempted to provide an empirically-based explanation to the second of these questions in terms of the evolution of the primary spatiotemporal self-locational reference frame into an independently driven, continuously self-anticipating and thereby self-recognizing, inherently subjective state of self-awareness as i-here-now.
